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NOTES

FEDERAL PROCEDURE
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IN INJUNCTION SUITS
AGAINST FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS
The doctrine of laissez-faire,though it lingers in our economic vocabulary, disappeared as a working principle of
American government with the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, and the enactment of
the Sherman Act three years later. The passage of regulatory
statutes may not again match the crescendo of the Thirties,
but repeal of basic control legislation seems remote. The administrative process impinges upon the daily schedule of most
people. When they feel injured by the functioning of the process (or feel that business success is more likely without govment interference) they habitually resort to the courts.1
A seemingly inconsequential opinion handed down at the
present term of the United States Supreme Court has unusual
practical significance when laid in this background of daily
contact with the executive branch of the Government-Mr.
Williams conducts a weight-reducing business in Los Angeles,
California, and uses the mails to "treat" his obese clientele.
The Postmaster General, after a hearing in Washington, D.C.,
determined that this was a fraudulent enterprise. He then
issued a "fraud order" directing Fanning, the postmaster at
Los Angeles, to stop the delivery of mail to Williams, to refrain from paying money orders addressed to him, and to
stamp "fraudulent" on his incoming correspondence and return it to the sender. 2 Williams thereupon brought an in1.

2.

Injunction Actions Against Federal Agencies Commenced in
United States District Courts, 1941-1947*
Year
84 Districts
Districtof Columbia Percent of total
brought in District
of Columbia
1941
178
165
51.9%
1942
215
161
42.8%
1943
227
108
32.2%
1944
331
158
32.3%
1945
328
116
26.3%
1946
335
144
30.0%
1947
266
143
35.0%
* Compiled from Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office)
Rev. Stat. §§3929, 4041 (1875), 39 U.S.C. §§259, 732 (1940) give
the Postmaster General authority to issue fraud orders "upon evidence satisfactory to him." The postal service statutes were passed in substance in 1872. 17 Stat. 322, 323. They differ from legislation of more recent vintage by providing for neither a hearing
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junction suit against Fanning in the Federal District Court

in California seeking to enjoin him from carrying out the
order and to have the order itself set aside.

On motion the suit was dismissed on the ground that the
Potmaster General was an indispensable party. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, relying on its

previous holding.3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held.,
reversed. Where relief may be granted without decreeing
that the department head take action he is not an indispensable party to the suit. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490
(1947) (Vinson, C.J., and Burton, J., dissenting without
opinion.)

The problem of determining when a superior government
officer is an indispensable party4 to a suit instituted against
his subordinate administrative officer has long been a vexing

3.
4.

nor judicial review. Justices Holmes and Brandeis had misgivings
that the power given by the statute was a previous restraint. See
dissenting opinion in Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 140 (1922).
It was held, however, that the delegation of authority to issue fraud
orders was constitutional, provided there be judicial review where
the Postmaster General has acted illegally. Public Clearing House
v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 509 (1904); American School of Magnetic
Healingv. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109 (1902).
A hearing also is customarily afforded, and perhaps must be
given. Elliott Works v. Frisk, 58 F.2d 820, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1932)
(a full hearing should be permitted on demand); Donnell v.
Wyman, 156 Fed. 415, 416 (C.C.E.D.Mo. 1907) (findings must be
after investigation and hearing to be binding on the Court).
Whether the adequacy of the hearing is to be measured by the
usual standards seems not to have been squarely met. In Pike v.
Walker, where the procedural due process argument was macle,
Judge Groner avoided the constitutional issue, putting his decision
on the ground that petitioner was conducting an obviously fraudulent enterprise and was not prejudiced by the failure of the Postmaster General to read the evidence before signing the order. 121
F.2d 40 (App. D.C. 1941), Note, 50 Yale L. J. 1479. The post office
department's i)rocedure in these cases is reviewed with recommendations in "Final Rep. Att'y Gen's Comm. on Ad. Proc.," 150-155
(1941).
Neher v. Harwood, 128 F.2d 846 (C.C.A. 9th 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 659 (1942).
The rule has been frequently invoked in litigation between private
parties. The classic statement of it is that of Mr. Justice Curtis
in Shields v. Barrows. He defined indispensable parties as "persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an
interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in
such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience." 17 How. 130, 139 (U.S.

1854),
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one. The consequences, however, of holding him to be indispensable are clear-the suit must be dismissed' and may
then be brought only at the seat of the government, i.e., in the
District of Columbia. This is almost invariably true for there
are two barriers to proceeding with the suit in the plaintiff's
district: (1) Without consent of the superior or his fortuitous
presence in the plantiff's district the federal court does not
have jurisdiction of his person; (2) The general venue statute
provides that except in diversity cases the plaintiff must sue
in the defendant's district6
The first American case to apply the indispensable party
rule to governmental officers was Warner Valley Stock Co.
v. Smith, decided in 1897. 7 It was there held that a mandatory injunction suit against the Land Commissioner and the
Secretary of the Interior to compel the issuance of land patents abated after the latter's resignation, since relief was
sought primarily against him. The minor official was sued,
said the Court, only to restrain him from carrying out the
orders of his superior. The rule of this case seemed destined
to fall into desuetude, for it was not resorted to for twentyseven years, when it appeared in Gnerich v. Rutter.8 There
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was authorized by the
National Prohibition Act to issue liquor permits. A suit
brought against a subordinate in California was dismissed on
the ground that he acted only under the direction of the Commissioner, who was therefore an indispensable party. The
same principle was applied at the next term in Webster v.
5.

Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193 (U.S. 1827). There is scant literature on the problem of superior government officers as indispensable parties. The question is effectively treated in Note, 50
Yale L. J. 909 (1941).
See also Alpert, "Suits Against Administrative Agencies Under N.I.R.A. and A.A.A.," 12 N.Y.U.L. Q. Rev. 393, 405-411 (1935); 37 Col. L. Rev. 140 (1937); 4 U.
of Chi. L. Rev. 342 (1937). See Note, 158 A.L.R. 1126 (1945).
6. 49 Stat. 1213 (1936), 28 U.S.C. §112 (1940). See 2 Moore "Federal Practice" 2138 (1938). These cases do not come within the
diversity clause because an officer having his residence in the
District of Columbia is not a citizen of a state within the meaning
of that clause. Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U.S. 395 (1897). See Dykes
and Keefee, "Diversity of Citizenship Clause--1940 Amendment" 21
Tulane L. Rev. 171 (1946). Lack of personal jurisdiction or lack
of venue when the indispensable party rule is invoked are important factors influencing the high percentage of total suits
brought to enjoin federal agencies which in the past have been
commenced in the District of Columbia. See table n.1, supra.
7. 165 U.S. 28 (1897).
8. 265 U.S. 388 (1924).
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Fall, a suit brought against a representative of the Secretary
of the Interior.9
As a consequence of this line of cases and the strong language used 0 it seemed early in 1925 that in most conceivable
circumstances a superior government officer was an indispensable party to a suit against his subordinate. Then came
Mr. Justice Holmes' decision in Colorado v. Toll." There Colorado sought to enjoin the superintendent of a national park
from enforcing regulations issued by the Director of the National Parks Service excluding from park property automobiles for hire, unless the driver had a permit from the Director. The Government, contending that the Secretary of
the Interior was an indispenable party, 2 cited the Warner
Valley, Gnerich and Fall cases. But the Court ignored them.
Without further explanation Mr. Justice Holmes stated that
the superior need not be joined, and gratuitously added that
the suit was not one against the United States. He cited
Missouri v. Holland"8 and Philadelphia v. Stimson 4 as authority for these two propositions. The Holland case was
dubious authority for the indispensable party rule since the
9.

266 U.S. 507 (1925). The Court was unembarrassed by the numerous cases where suit had been brought against the subordinate
official alone in the period between the Warner Valley and Gnerich
cases and there had been a determination of the cause on the
merits. See, eg., Swigart v. Baker, 229 U.S. 187 (1913) (suit
against reclamation officers of an irrigation project without joinder of Sec'y of the Interior); Public Clearing House v. Coyne,
194 U.S. 497 (1904) (bill in equity against Chicago postmaster
decided on the merits). Cf. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
"Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the
attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as
having been so decided as to constitute precedents." Webster v.
Fall, 266 U.S. at 511.
10. "To maintain such a bill against the subordinate officer alone,
without joining his superior, whose acts are alleged to have been
unlawful, would be contrary to settled rules of equity pleading."
Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28, 34 (1897). "He
[the superior] is the public's real representative in the matter, and
if the injunction were granted his are the hands which would be
tied. All this being so, he should have been made a party defendant-the principal one-and given opportunity to defend his
direction and regulations." Gnerich v. Rutter, 265 U.S. 388, 391
(1924).
11. 268 U.S. 228 (1925).
12. Mr. Justice Douglas' abstract of Colorado v. Toll in the instant
case is slightly inaccurate in this respect. The park was put under
the general control of the Secretary of the Interior by the statute, 38 Stat. 798 (1915), and it was the Secretary and not the Director whom the Government insisted was an indispensable party.
13. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
14. 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
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question was not raised there. In the Stimson case the Secretary of War and his subordinates were sued in the District
of Columbia, and one question before the Court was whether
it was a suit against the United States.
The passage of the opinion seems to have been the inception of a confusion which plagues us yet, viz., the relation
between the sovereign immunity doctrine and the indispensable party rule. It has become the practice in recent years
to cite cases from either of these two lines indiscriminately
on the indispensable party question."' Holmes' citation of
one case for each point retainea an essential bifurcation which
has thus been regrettably ignored.
The sovereign immunity body of law has had a perceptible and confusing influence on the progress of the indispensable party rule, an influence which no opinion has articulately examined. This confusion has manifested itself in two
ways. First, sovereign immunity cases hold that where the
allegation is one of trespass to property or lack of constitutional or statutory authority there is jurisdiction to hear
the case because the United States is not the real party in
interest.16 Many courts transposed this rule into the indispensable party area without real consideration, and held that
where the allegation was one of action taken under an unconstitutional statute or beyond the authority granted in the
statute, the court had jurisdiction to hear the case without
requiring the superior to be before it.'Y The reasoning of the
immunity cases was merely a useful device by which suit
might be allowed although arguably against the United States.
It was not appropriate reasoning, nor was it useful, to determine the indispensability of a superior officer. Its inutility
is seen when it is noted that those courts which imported
the immunity rule that suit would lie where an attack was
15.
16.
17.

See n.17 infra.
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937); U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
Cf. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); Philadelphia v. Sthnson,
223 U.S. 605 (1912).
For sovereign immunity cases exemplifying the rule see cases n.
16, supra. A negative implication from the rule is that if the
officers are acting within their statutory authority then buit cannot be brought without the consent of the United States. Ferris
v. Wilbur, 27 F.2d 262 (C.C.A. 4th 1928).
Indispensable party
cases transposing the sovereign immunity line of authority are:
Neher v. Harwood, 128 F.2d 846 (C.C.A. 9th 1942); Yarnell v.
Hillsborough Packing Co., 70 F.2d 435 (C.C.A. 5th 1934); Brotherhood v. Madden, 48 F.Supp. 366 (D.C.Md. 1944). The rule is of
course circular, jurisdiction turning on the point to be decided.
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made on the base of the officer's authority made the tenuous
distinction that when the allegation was abuse of discretion
by the superior he was an indispensable party. 8
There is a second element in some of the sovereign immunity cases which makes jurisdiction turn, not only on the
allegation made, but also on the consequences of the decree
sought. The focal point in those cases is the ability of the
court to grant relief without interfering with the Government, e.g., by requiring money to be paid out of its treasury.
Thus in the famous case of Osborn v. Bank of the United
States's state officials had seized money from the bank in violation of an injunction against collection by them of an unconstitutional state tax. In an action by the bank to recover
the tax the officers' plea of sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment failed. 20 This result was reached not
only by considering the act of the officials a trepass for which
they were personally liable, but the Court also pointed out
that the funds remained segregated and had not been mingled
generally with other treasury finds. Because of the latter
fact the lower court could grant restitution. In Mine Safety
Appliances Co. v. Forrestal1 the then Under Secretary of the
Ndvy, having determined that Mine Safety was receiving excessive profits on government contracts within the meaning
of the Renegotiation Act, threatened to direct disbursing officers to withhold payments. In an injunction action to restrain him from carrying out his threat the Supreme Court
decided that the suit was essentially one "designed to reach
money which the government owns . . . the government is
18.

Suppose the Postmaster General determines that a certain "cure"
is fraudulent, basing his order on opinion evidence. If the Supreme
Court construes the statute to cover only fraud "in fact" has the
Postmaster General abused his discretion or acted beyond his authority? See American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
187 U.S. 94 (1902). It has been held that an assertion of arbitrariness or error in arriving at a conclusion is not a challenge of
the foundation of the superior's authority but merely assails the
manner of its exercise. Acret v. Harwood, 41 F.Supp. 492, 494
(S.D.Calif. 1941).
19. 9 Wheat. 738 (U.S. 1824).
20. No explicit provision in the Constitution gives the Federal Govermnent immunity from suit as is the case with the states, to which
the Eleventh Amendment applies. Bu't the United States may not
be sued without its consent, U.S. v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436, 444 (U.S.
1834), and the strength of the doctrine of immunity seems to be
the same with regard to both governments. See Keifer & Keifer
v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939).
21. 326 U.S. 371 (1945).
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an indispensable party. '22 The bearing of this type of sovereign immunity reasoning on the indispensable party question
becomes apparent upon examination of the case of Land v.
Dollar,23 a sovereign immunity case written by Mr. Justice
Douglas at the last term of Court. There a stockholders' suit
was brought against members of the Maritime Commission
seeking to command the return of stock, record title to which
was in the Commission. It was held that the District Court
had jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits since the
judgment sought was not one which "would expend itself on
the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public
administration. '' 24 In the instant case the Justice stated that
the department head is not an indispensable party "if the
decree which is entered will effectively grant the relief by
expending itself on the subordinate official who is before the
court.25 It thus becomes evident that the derivation of the
Williams v. Fanning rule lies not in indispensable party authority but in the sovereign immunity cases.
In view of the source of the rule as now formulated it
is not surprising that the lower federal courts, who have
been faced since 1925 with the two incongruous lines of authority (Warner Valley, Gnerich and Fall as opposed to the
Toll case), were not able to find a satisfactory rationale in
those cases. Judge Learned Hand, for example, suggested
that Toll might be confined to cases in which the quasisovereign rights of a state were involved. 28 He concluded that
the superior was an indispensable party in all situations, for
otherwise the minor official might find himself in a "crossfire" between what his superior had commanded and the
court forbidden.
In the interim between Toll and Fanning the Supreme
Court consistently refused to intimate its position.2 Mr. Jus22. Id. at 375.
23. 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
24. Id. at 738.
25.

26.
27.

Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. at 494. The Douglas rule obtains
oblique support from the first case on the indispensable party,
problem. Vernon v. Blackerby, 2 Atk. 145, 21 Eng. Rep. 491
(1740). See also Rood v. Goodman, 85 F.2d (C.C.A. 5th 1936);
Note, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 796, 802 (1937).
National Conference on Legalizing Lotteries v. Goldman, 85 F.2d

66, 67 (C.C.A. 2d 1936).

See, e.g., Varney v. Warehime, 147 F.2d 238 (C.C.A. 6th 1945),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 882 (1945) (War Food Administrator not
an indispensable party where his statutory power drawn in ques-
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tice Roberts did state in Brooks v. Dewar, where it had been
argued that the Secretary of the Interior and the United
States were both indispensable parties to a suit, that it was
not "an easy matter to reconcile all the decisions of the court
in this class of cases. . . . We are not disposed to attempt a
critique of the authorities.1128 However, the Supreme Court
stated with assurance in the principal case that the distinction
between its former cases was clear. It must be concluded,
nevertheless, that the Court was free to choose between its
own irreconcilable decisions. In terms of result it chose to
allow suit to lie against the subordinate alone. In what
seems to be a pure policy decision, bolstered by the analogy
of the immunity cases, it found the "distinction" that the
superior is an indispensable party only where the relief
sought will require him to take action, "either by exercising
directly a power lodged in him or by having a subordinate
exercise it for him.1 29 Presumably, in all other cases the subordinate alone might be sued. In so holding the Court has
indorsed a policy of decentralization.
Although the Court did not discuss relevant policy considerations, essentially it was making a judgment as to whether suit should be limited to the seat of our centralized government or be allowed to be brought in the states. The cost of
litigation far from plaintiff's districts and the resultant disadvantage of being restricted to deposition procedure (in lieu
of taking witnesses to Washington) make a sympathetic case
for allowing suit in the district of the challenger of governmental action.30 Balanced against this is the interference with

28.
29.
30.

tion); Jump v. Ellis, 100 F.2d 130 (C.C.A. 10th 1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 645 (1939) (suit against Indian Agency superintendent
could not be maintained without joining the Secretary of the Interior); Rood v. Goodman, 83 F.2d 28 (C.C.A. 5th 1936), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 551 (1936) (Postmaster General held an indispensable
party).
Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 359 (1941).
832 U.S. at 493.
Cf. Senator Dill of Washington in floor debate on the Federal Communications Act of 1934: "Those owners of radio broadcasting
stations living long distances from the District of Columbia should
not be required to come to Washington to prosecute an appeal from
a decision. . . . A station owner who lives in the Rocky Mountain
area, or who lives in the Far West, and who is compelled to come
to the District of Columbia to prosecute his appeal, finds himself
faced with an expense of from $400 to $500 for the mere trip of
coming here, an equal amount for his attorney, if he brings one,
and then the attorney fees in addition. I say of personal knowledge that some of the station owners have found it almost im-
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the Government which might result from requiring it to defend a large number of geographically dispersed suits. Of
course a United States Attorney will defend in either event,
and it seems a less onerous burden on the Government to defend in the several districts than to require plaintiffs to go to
Washington.-0 Where because of the number of federal courts
passing on the same matters, conflicting decisions or interpretations of statutes develop, the Supreme Court will perform its customary role of leveller.
A survey of Congressional policy as expressed in more
recent statutes shows an understanding by that body of plaintiffs' problems in a country so large as ours and a marked
trend toward decentralization for the purposes of bringing
suit. For example, the National Labor Relations Act,31 the
Fair Labor Standards Act,32 and the Public Utility Holding
Company Act 3 3 provide for review of regulations in the Circuit Courts of Appeals where plaintiffs transact business.
The Federal Tort Claims Act,3 ' passed in 1946, presents an
interference with the Government, in that it requires the
Government both to defend actions and to expend its funds.
Yet Congress there made a judgment that this minimal inconvenience is outweighed by the burden on plaintiffs, if
they are required to go to Washington, and so provided that
suit may be brought in the district where the act complained
of took place.
possible to finance appeals in that way." 78 Cong. Rec. 8825
(1934).
30a. In the states a somewhat different transportation problem is presented. For example, in Indiana a claim for money damages may
be brought only in the Marion County Court, i.e., at the seat of
government. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §4-1501. However,
"any party or person aggrieved" is entitled to judicial review of a
determination by a state administrative agency in the circuit or
superior court of the county where that person resides or where
the order is to be enforced. Ind. Acts 1947, c.365, §14. See 22
Ind. L. J. 319, 323 (1947).
31. 49 Stat. 457 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §160(f) (1940).
32. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 28 U.S.C. §210 (1940).
33. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §79(x) (1940). Most of the statutes
are collated in 32 Ill. L. Rev. 99 (1938).
34. 60 Stat. 842, 28 U.S.C.A. §921 (Supp. 1947). Congress might
provide for decentralization in the indispensable party area by
passing a venue and process statute allowing a plaintiff to join a
superior government officer in any federal court and obtain personal service on him in the District of Columbia. 4 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 342, 343 (1937).
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II
The rule which emerged from Mr. Justice Douglas'
policy judgment in the instant case, viz., a superior government officer is an indispensable party if the decree granting
the relief will require him to do an act, brings to mind other
legal distinctions which have not withstood critical examination: equity could give a prohibitive but not a mandatory
injunction; there was no judicial review of a "negative order"
in administrative law. Is the rule of Williams v. Fanning
similarly doomed?
Occasional statutes do give power to the superior alone
to do some act, as to issue a license. But in fact he is
only a repository of the power. Thus in the Warner Valley
case the plaintiff sued for the affirmative act of the issuance
of a patent by the superior. Under the Douglas rule it would
seem that he might not sue for the issuance of the patent at
all, but merely seek to restrain the Land Office Commissioner,
the subordinate, from interfering with his occupancy of the
land. In the Gnerich case where the local prohibition director was sued to restrain him from giving effect to a particular restriction as to amount in a liquor permit, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was held to be an indispensable party. It would appear an opposite result would be required under the new rule. Certainly the decree would expend itself on the subordinate. A request for negative relief
against the subordinate will never require the superior to do
a new act.35 And so plaintiffs, in situations such as that in
G'rimes Packing Co. v. Hynes,3 may evade the prima facie
operation of the rule by suing, not for the superior's permission to fish in certain waters, but may bring suit against the
subordinate to restrain his enforcement of the regulations
promulgated by his superior.
The crux of the matter is that whichever course a plaintiff pursues the identical question is before the court, that is,
the legality of a department or board's action. Yet the mere
form of the relief requested (i.e., not that the superior be required to do an act, but that his subordinate be prevented
from doing one) determines jurisdiction under the Douglas
rule, and the verbally astute attorney can save his client the
35.
36.

See National Conference on Legalizing Lotteries v. Goldman, 85
F.2d 66, 67 (C.C.A. 2d 1936).
67 F.Supp. 43 (D.C.Alaska 1946).
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A court should be focusing its attention

on the merits of the case before it, rather than contemplating
whether the decree it will have to frame in the event of a
plaintiff's success will necessarily require a department head
to do an act.
III
Thus over a period of fifty years, during the last two
decades of which the problem has come up frequently, the
courts have struggled with the formulation of an indispensable party rule with questionable results. If it is permissible
to say they are yet unsuccessful, would they not do well to
abandon the task? One clean approach occurs.
Fundamentally, the unprofitable dwelling on deciding
who are indispensable parties arises because courts are preoccupied with the party theory of the suit. This preoccupation with parties is engendered by two factors. The first of
these is the fiction that in an injunction action against a govermnent officer who is threatening to enforce an invalid
statute the officer loses his representative character and that
consequently the suit is against him as a private party and is
not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity3 7 The
second factor is the tradition that equity acts in personam.
Is it necessary to retain the fiction that a public officer
loses his representative character when it is alleged that he
is acting illegally? In the field of proprietary corporations
the present "climate of opinion" on the Court is that in the
absence of a specific endowment with immunity such corporations are amenable to suit at law in tort or contract.3 8 Proprietary corporations may be considered as unique. Yet
even in the ordinary realm of administrative agencies Congress usually provides for judicial review of administrative
action. The effect is to allow suit against the administrator.
When there is not a statutory procedure for testing the validity of administrative determinations, the older devices of
extraordinary legal remedies may be utilized. 39 Or as was
true of the fraud order statute involved in the instant case,
the courts may deem it necessary to engraft judicial review
37.
38.

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U.S.

381 (1939).
39. For bibliography of the literature on the non-statutory remedies
with respect to administrative action see Gellhorn, "Administrative
Law, Cases and Comments" 807 (2d ed. 1947).
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on the statute to save it from constitutional attack.4 0 In
the light of this legislative and judicial inclination to allow
review of acts of administrative officers it does not seem
that the ancient rigor of the sovereign immunity doctrine
should prevent adoption of the view that suits against administrative officers are against them as representatives of the
government. And this theory still allows equity to act against
the person.
The suggestion that injunction suits be viewed henceforth as against officers as officers is not to urge that
new rights or remedies be created against the United States.
Viewing the suit as one against the officer in his representative capacity does not change any existing right
or remedy against the Government. It merely approaches
the existing review procedure in another way. It recognizes
that an act of a department is being challenged as illegal, and
that wherever defended the Government is the real party in
interest. Were the courts to accept this view the indispensable
party problem would become unimportant. Whenever a responsible official threatened to enforce a statute or regulation
his action would be treated as official conduct. It would become the Government's duty to defend injunction actions
brought against such an officer.
This approach would obviate the inherent difficulties
which have arisen in attempting to formulate and administer
an indispensable party rule. It would also allow a democratic
government to defend allegedly despotic acts at the door of
the person who considers himself oppressed and not at the
seat of the oppressor. Mr. Justice Douglas' rule that a
superior officer is an indispensable party only when the decree requires him to do a new act, or conversely, when the
decree will not "expend itself" on the subordinate, appears
to reach the suggested result, i.e., decentralization of suits, in
most cases. But this may not be uniformly true, because as
shown, under his test plaintiffs' attorneys must choose accurately the stage of the administrative process at which to
assert an alleged right and frame their prayers for relief with
precision. Also implicit in his rule is acceptance of a useless
fiction, the individual theory of the suit. If like results may
be attained by a straightforward approach, why adhere to
an elusive indispensable party rule?
40.

See n.2 supra.

